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AIndeterminate Oughts*
J. Robert G. Williams
Sometimes it is indeterminate what an agent morally ought do. This generates a
Decision Ought Challenge—to give moral guidance to agents in such a scenario.
This article is a field guide to the options for a theory of the decision ought for
cases of indeterminacy. Three categories of view are evaluated, and the best rep-
resentative for each is identified.I. INTRODUCTION: FROM UNCERTAINTY TO INDETERMINACY
Sometimes there is something that agents ought to do, but epistemic
limitations prevent them from knowing what that is. Such Uncertain Ought
scenarios have been the focus of recent literature. An example:*
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ll use You have promised to vote for Mary in an election for party presi-
dent. You then learn that Fred’s policies are much better. What to
do? . . . Suppose that you are pretty sure but far from certain that
you promised to vote for Mary. It was some time ago; it was quite
a party; you know you indicated that you would vote for her, but
did you actually promise to do so? What should absolutists about
promise keeping say about how the element of doubt affects the
question of what you ought to do in such a case?1There is a reading on which the correct promise-absolutist answer to the
question who ought you vote for? is that you ought to vote for Mary if and
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Anot give applicable moral advice for agents in Uncertain Ought scenar-
ios, given their ignorance of the relevant (nonmoral) facts. Even friends
of the objective ought should see a role for an account of moral guid-
ance for agents with limited factual information. Following Smith and
Jackson, we call the target of such a theory the ‘decision ought’ (aka ‘the
subjective ought’). The Decision Ought Challenge is to construct a theory of
this decision ought.
My concern in this article is with a variant of the Decision Ought
Challenge, prompted not by Uncertain Ought scenarios but by Indetermi-
nate Ought scenarios. Consider the variant of the above case in which you
recollect exactly what you said to Mary at the party, but you know that
what happened was a borderline case of promising: your words were am-
biguous and your level of intoxication was neither clearly too high to pre-
vent you making contracts with another nor clearly low enough to allow
them to be made. In short, you are aware of all the relevant underlying
facts, but they don’t settle the matter of whether a promise was made.
Again we raise the question whether you ought to vote for Fred or Mary.
Again it may be correct to say that you ought to vote for Mary iff you prom-
ised that you would. But just as in the original setup, this gives you no
moral guidance. Your uncertainty in this case about whether you prom-
isedMary your votemay ormay not be the same phenomenon as everyday
uncertainty about factual or normative matters (henceforth: quotidian
uncertainty)—that is up for debate. But whatever the character of the un-
certainty prompted by borderline or indeterminate cases, they set up
a Decision Ought Challenge to develop a theory of applicable moral
advice.
There is no consensus view about how we ought to factor indetermi-
nacy into moral deliberation. There is indeed no consensus view con-
cerning how indeterminacy interacts with rational decisionmakingmore
generally. But there has been progress on the latter question recently,
and this puts us in a position to address the Decision Ought Challenge
for Indeterminate Oughts. This article will chart the territory, canvassing
first the possibility of reducing the problem to that of (quotidian) Uncer-
tain Oughts and second the possibility of building on distinctive theories
of indeterminacy and rational decision making.
This article is a scouting report on the contours of an underexplored
philosophical landscape. We are not yet in a position to see which of the
approaches surveyed will be vindicated, though some readers will no
doubt find themselves with commitments in this area in virtue of their ex-
tant commitments elsewhere. But this will be an opinionated report. For
each of the three broad categories of approach surveyed below, I will iden-
tify the account within that category that has the best chance of success.
The plan of campaign is as follows. Section II takes stock of varieties
of moral indeterminacy that may lead to Indeterminate Ought scenarios.This content downloaded from 129.011.023.120 on March 31, 2017 07:18:49 AM
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ASection III evaluates the proposal that moral decision making under in-
determinacy is just a special case of moral decisionmaking under quotid-
ian uncertainty—and so no easier or harder than the latter. The key ques-
tion is what commitments we have to take on to sustain this reduction.
Though the leading account here is epistemicism (as per Williamson),
in the light of special problems that epistemicism has in accounting for
the stability of moral concepts, I will be recommending a different repre-
sentative for this class of theories.2 In Section IV, I describe a family of
nonclassical theories of the decision ought under indeterminacy, build-
ing on my previous work on rational nonclassical decision making under
indeterminacy.3 Nonclassical theories allow certain kinds of moral inde-
terminacy to be bracketed—in the sense that they will not lead to Indeter-
minate Ought scenarios. They promise to allow us to evade apparent in-
stances of the Decision Ought Challenge. However, not every case of
moral indeterminacy can be evaded in this way. The second task of this
section is to apply the nonclassical theories directly to the residual Inde-
terminate Ought cases. The accounts that emerge often have some un-
welcome features. One particular nonclassical theory looks best placed
to avoid these, and in the light of this I recommend it as the best repre-
sentative of this category of views. In Section V, I offer an alternative ac-
count of the decision ought under indeterminacy, building on my previ-
ous “classical supervaluational”Mind Making model of classical decision
making under indeterminacy.4 By generalizing an observation I’ve made
elsewhere I argue that this is not subject to the problem identified in Sec-
tion IV for analogous approaches within the nonclassical paradigm.5 The
conclusion identifies issues to be tackled in future work in the area.
II. VARIETIES OF MORAL INDETERMINACY
Below we take stock of varieties of moral indeterminacy. As well as clar-
ifying our subject matter, this initial survey will allow us to identify the
relevance of global or local skepticism about moral indeterminacy to sub-
sequent discussion.
A. Indeterminacy in (the Application of) the Moral Code
Suppose one thinks that there is a basic moral principle that (absolutely)
prohibits promise breaking. Then the notion promising appears in the2. Timothy Williamson, Vagueness (London: Routledge, 1994).
3. See J. Robert G. Williams, “Nonclassical Minds and Indeterminate Survival,” Philo-
sophical Review 123 (2014): 379–428, and “Indeterminacy, Angst and Conflicting Values,”
Ratio 29 (2016): 412–33.
4. See J. Robert G. Williams, “Decision Making under Indeterminacy,” Philosopher’s Im-
print 14 (2014): 1–34.
5. Williams, “Indeterminacy, Angst and Conflicting Values.”
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Avery content of our basic moral code. It is because that notion admits
borderline cases that we get moral indeterminacy, and this moral inde-
terminacy can be leveraged, as above, to construct a scenario in which
it is indeterminate what an agent ought do.
This kind of moral indeterminacy illustrates our first broad class of
cases of moral indeterminacy.6 Other (absolute or overridable) prohibi-
tions give the same kind of result: a prohibition on killing an innocent per-
son will plausibly generate Indeterminate Ought scenarios if we trade on
the vagueness of killing, innocence, or personhood.7 Themoral codeneed
not even be deontological to deliver cases of this kind. Moral axiology—
concerned with assigning moral value to outcomes—is prima facie not
crystalline. Perhaps moral demerits are assigned to outcomes if a promise
breaking or killing of the innocent occurs therein; indeterminacy in these
features will then generate indeterminacy in the value of outcomes.
There is an alternative indirect route tomoral indeterminacy through
promising. It can be indeterminate whether a promise would be broken
by a certain outcome (and therefore, whether a prohibition is violated
or disvalue accrues) when it’s determinate that it was promised that p,
but subsequent actions leave it indeterminate whether p. Thus, vagueness
in what counts as “faithfulness” can lead to indeterminacy in whether
a vow of fidelity was kept. A commitment to one’s family not to work
on the weekend is vulnerable to the indeterminacy of “work” and “week-
end,” and a contract to install a new main water pipe safely is vulnerable
to the vagueness of “safe.” The moral code need not use the vague vo-
cabulary of faithful, weekend, or safe in order to generate these moral in-
determinacies: the role it gives to linguistically framed social institutions
of promising allows individuals or society to turn almost any indetermi-6. The moral code need not be absolutist to get this result. An overridable moral pro-
hibition on breaking a promise may still generate an Indeterminate Ought scenario, in a
case in which the putative prohibition would not be overridden.
7. Vague personal identity makes for a particularly rich source of indeterminacy in the
content of the moral code. Vagueness in who is the same person as whom can lead to in-
determinacy in who has obligations or legitimate demands as a result of earlier happenings
or how to value outcomes. For just one example: distributional justice requires that suffer-
ing not be concentrated over time in a single individual, and this contributes to the (dis)
value of an outcome. But in a situation in which it is indeterminate whether two people in
the past or in the future count as the same person (because, e.g., of psychological disrup-
tion in the intervening years) it will be indeterminate whether the suffering is so concen-
trated and so whether an outcome is or is not distributionally unjust. For raw materials for
indeterminate personal identity, see Bernard Williams, “The Self and the Future,” Philo-
sophical Review 79 (1970): 161–80 (repr., Problems of the Self [Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1973], 46–63); Peter van Inwagen,Material Beings (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1990); and Theodore Sider, “Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Concep-
tual Analysis,” in “Philosophical Perspectives,” suppl., Noûs 15 (2001): 189–209. My “Inde-
terminacy, Angst and Conflicting Values” contains ethical decision problems based on such
cases.
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Anacy in any sentence into a moral indeterminacy, if the appropriate
promise is undertaken (or law written or contract made). So the moral
code itself might be written in a perfectly precisified vocabulary, and
moral indeterminacy could still arise by this indirect route.
B. Structural Indeterminacy
The cases discussed so far trace Indeterminate Oughts back to vagueness
in specific prohibitions or axiological rules. But another important cate-
gory of moral indeterminacies generating Indeterminate Oughts arises
from the structural features of morality: how value assignments or con-
straints come together to determine which acts are permissible. A first ex-
ample involves value aggregation. You have a bag of goods to deliver to a
charity shop and have to turn left (to the homeless charity) or right (to
the arts charity). Itmay be quite clearhowmuchmarginal value themoney
earned will realize in relieving suffering on the one hand and how much
marginal value theywouldhave in fostering arts on the other. Thedifficulty
is how to aggregate these two different kinds of value—to determine the
rate of exchange between them in order to arrive at an overall value to
the act of turning right or turning left.8 I follow Broome in diagnosing
the difficulty in such ‘superhard’or ‘incommensurable’decisionproblems
as one of indeterminacy: there is just no fact of thematter concerningwhat
quantity of extra artistic endeavor among poor kids in the community is
worth one extra night of someone sleeping rough.9 Giving to the arts char-
ity and giving to the homeless charity will both realize some pro tanto
goods, but it will be indeterminate whether the overall value of giving to
the homeless charity is greater or lower than the overall value of giving to
the arts charity, since it is indeterminate how to compare the disparate
goods.10
Aggregation indeterminacy is not the only kind of structural moral
indeterminacy. It’s plausible that agents have a range of permissible op-
tions about the extent to which they factor their own self-interests into8. I take this case from Miriam Schoenfield, “Decision Making in the Face of Parity,”
in “Philosophical Perspectives,” suppl., Noûs 28 (2014): 263–77.
9. See John Broome, “Is Incommensurability Vagueness?” in Ethics out of Economics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 123–44 (originally published in Incommen-
surability, Incomparability and Practical Reason, ed. Ruth Chang [Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press 1997], 67–89).
10. Another example of aggregation indeterminacy involves trade-offs between over-
ridable prohibitions and the value of consequences—for a deontologist but nonabsolutist
about promising, one’s promise to vote for Mary will mean one objectively ought to vote
for her when the consequences of voting for Fred are only marginally better; when the con-
sequences are massively better, the promise is overridden. In the middle we can expect bor-
derline cases. A third possible example of aggregation indeterminacy would be when two
overridable promises conflict.
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Aevaluating outcomes.11 This is critical to understanding permissible (but
not obligatory) self-sacrifice. If I put myself in danger (leap off the bridge
onto the tracks) to save a child’s life, that is heroism and permissible. If I
push you off the bridge, with the same result, that is assault and impermis-
sible. I have the liberty of factoring in prospective benefits to myself to a
greater or lesser extent in evaluating a prospect resulting from an action
open to me. Thus, even if the content of prohibitions or axiological rules
doesn’t mention personal identity, the structural role of agents’ options
means that indeterminacy in whether they are the same person as one of
those affected can produce indeterminacy in what it is permissible to do.12
C. Evasive and Eliminative Maneuvers
In the cases above, it’s worth noting the gap between claiming that there
is indeterminacy in some morally relevant fact and the claim that this in-
determinacy in turn produces indeterminacy in what ought to be done.
In many cases, there will be plausible principles bridging this gap. But
for all we’ve said, one’s overall theory might seek to insulate evaluation
of action from this underlying indeterminacy. For example, an overrid-
able prohibition on breaking promises may say that it is automatically
overridden if it is a borderline case. Structural rules might tell us how to
weigh borderline prohibitions against good outcomes. An evasion strat-
egy is one which avoids the Decision Ought Challenge for indetermi-
nacy, not by denyingmoral indeterminacy in the broadest sense but by de-
nying that moral indeterminacy gives rise to indeterminacy in what one
objectively ought do. We’ll be considering a (limited) evasion strategy in
the discussion of truth-centric indeterminate axiological rules and pro-
hibitions in Section IV below.1311. I am fond of (a slight variant of) the treatment of this phenomenon put forward
in Ted Sider, “Asymmetry and Self-Sacrifice,” Philosophical Studies 70 (1993): 117–32.
12. Consider cases in which I know now that certain benefits which I have the option
of taking now will damage the interests of a future person x, where it is indeterminate
whether I am x. If the benefits are saving the child and the damage is x’s death, we have
a recipe for a case in which it is indeterminate whether the act is heroism or assault, be-
cause it is indeterminate whether x is someone whose interests moral theory allows me to dis-
count. See also n. 7 above.
13. One evasion strategy in cases of ethical uncertainty is to appeal tomoral safety—the
idea that when it would be wrong to bring about a certain outcome, it’s also wrong to risk
bringing about that outcome. One might try to extend this from riskiness to indetermi-
nacy, by arguing that if it’s wrong to bring about a situation such that p, it is wrong to bring
about a situation in which it is not determinately not p. I do not consider such derivative
constraints here explicitly, but some of the “dilemma-style” accounts of the decision ought
in Sec. IV might be seen as articulating this thought. For discussion in the context of vague-
ness and the ethics of abortion, see Roy Sorensen, “Vagueness and the Desiderata for Def-
inition,” in Definitions and Definability, ed. J. H. Fetzer, D. Shatz, and G. Schlesinger (Dor-
drecht: Springer, 1991), 71–109.
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AThe many kinds of moral indeterminacy illustrate how radical one
would have to be to avoid the Decision Ought Challenge for indetermi-
nacy by denying the very existence of moral indeterminacy. The option
might be pursued: seeking to eliminate vagueness in the content of the
moral code, one might argue that our familiar formulations of moral
rules are mere approximations to patterns that arise in virtue of the fun-
damental moral code, to be written in some crystalline, utterly precise
‘moralese’.14 But more local skepticism is more plausible: one could
question whether one specific kind of indeterminacy put forward above
is really rightly classified as indeterminacy. Ruth Chang argues that the
distinctive puzzles of moral aggregation do not reflect moral indetermi-
nacy.15 A consequentialist might reject vague moral prohibitions because
she does not admit a theoretically significant category, moral prohibition,
in the first place.
One who feels tempted by global evasion or global skepticism about
Indeterminate Oughts will have to explain away all apparent instances of
moral sorites sequences. These consist of an ordered finite sequence of
possible actions, where the first case is clearly morally permissible, where
the last case is clearly morally impermissible, and where, due to their ex-
treme similarity in morally relevant respects, for each N we seem com-
pelled to deny that case N ismorally permissible and case N1 1 is morally
impermissible. Examples are plentiful in the literature. Constantinescu
gives examples of the quantity of lies compatible with a moral imperative
to be honest, with the intensity of pain inflicted compatible with a prohi-
bition on being cruel, and (borrowing from Sorensen) with the quantity
of blood one can extract from a person without acting wrongly.16 Prima14. The notion of moralese (a supposed language in which the most fundamental
moral truths are articulated) is designed to echo ontologese (a supposed language in which
the most fundamental metaphysical truths are articulated). In each case, ordinary moral or
ontological truths will be grounded in the truths that can be formulated in moralese or
ontologese. On a certain kind of hard-core moral realism, moralese will be a proper part
of ontologese (Tristram McPherson, “What Is at Stake in Debates among Normative Real-
ists?”Noûs 49 [2015]: 123–46), but I do not build that into the notion. The claim that
ontologese is precise is one way to articulate a prominent thought that there is no meta-
physical vagueness (Elizabeth Barnes, “Fundamental Indeterminacy,” Analytic Philosophy 55
[2014]: 339–62). Despite its currency, it’s hard to identify good reasons for this assump-
tion. The status of moralese is similar. It’s difficult for me to envisage what crystalline
moralese would look like. Perhaps impersonal hedonistic utilitarianism would be a candi-
date but only if it could never be indeterminate how many hedons of pleasure a given out-
come realizes—and why believe that?
15. See Ruth Chang, “The Possibility of Parity,” Ethics 112 (2002): 659–88, and also her
introduction to Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason, 1–34. For discussion
and a response to Chang, see my “Indeterminacy, Angst and Conflicting Values.”
16. See Cristian Constantinescu, “Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-naturalism,”
in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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Afacie, sorites susceptibility shows that a term is vague and has borderline
cases. And the cases above seem to show that thick and thin ethical terms,
and in particular permissibility, have borderline cases. The latter case
means that not just moral indeterminacy in general but Indeterminate
Oughts in particular will be hard to avoid. Moral sorites are not the best
starting point for positive theorizing, since they are nonconstructive—
unlike the examples in our list above, they do not tell us what aspect of
moral theory is producing the indeterminacy. But they are an effective re-
buttal to global skeptics and evaders.
My project below is to explore how decision oughts work under
whatever moral indeterminacy there may be. For that project, I need
to cast the net as wide as possible, to provide a toolkit of interest to as
many moral theorists as I can, and for this dialectical reason I will set
aside local as well as global skepticism about moral indeterminacy.
III. REDUCTION TO QUOTIDIAN UNCERTAINTY
If our uncertainty over p, when we know that p is indeterminate, were
quotidian, then this article would be a short one. The Decision Ought
Challenge for indeterminacy would just be a special case of the Decision
Ought Challenge for uncertainty. Consider the case in which we know
it is borderline whether what we did counted as a promise to vote for
Mary, and hence indeterminate whether we objectively ought to vote
for Mary. The suggestion is that this produces a situation in which we
are uncertain whether we promised and so uncertain whether we ob-
jectively ought to vote for her. Indeterminacy may be a distinctive source
of quotidian uncertainty, but it’s unclear why the source of the uncer-
tainty should matter any more than whether the uncertainty results from
sources such as unreliable testimony, inexact observation, or lack of con-
fidence in recall. Whatever we say about the general case should just
be applied to the special case of indeterminacy-prompted uncertainty.
There would be no independent Decision Ought Challenge for moral
indeterminacy.
The reduction of the puzzle of moral indeterminacy to the puzzle of
moral uncertainty would be attractively economical, but its starting as-
sumption is prima facie peculiar. When one is (in the ordinary sense) un-
certain whether p, one can wonder whether p, gather evidence for or
against p, hope or fear that p will turn out to be the case. But in the case
of indeterminacy, one could simply know that there’s no fact of the mat-
ter whether p, and hoping, wondering, evidence gathering, and the other
accompaniments of ordinary uncertainty seem prima facie out of place2014), 9:152–85; and Roy Sorensen, Vagueness and Contradiction (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001).
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Awhen one knows already that there is no fact out there to be hoped for or
wondered about.
The hypothesis to be explored in this section is that the above be-
trays a mistaken prototheory of indeterminacy. To substantiate such a
charge, we need a conception of indeterminacy which predicts and ex-
plains quotidian uncertainty in the relevant cases. There is a natural can-
didate here: Williamson’s version of the epistemicist theory of vagueness.17
As I will understand this proposal, it asserts there is a fact of the matter
concerning which pebble addition makes a nonheap into a heap or
which color shade marks the boundary between blue and nonblue—or
indeed, as to who is the same person as whom, how values aggregate into
overall moral value, under what conditions one has promised, and so
forth. According to Williamson we do not and practically cannot know
where these sharp boundaries lie, which generates an irresolvable but
quotidian uncertainty over whether a borderline case of promising is
genuinely a promise, and so forth. Williamson offers an explanation of
why knowledge cannot be obtained in such cases: he argues that any po-
lar judgments concerning borderline cases could easily be false, consis-
tent with all our evidence, and for that reason will never count as knowl-
edge (they’re “unsafe”).
What entitles Williamson to the claim that judgments in the border-
line area are unsafe? He offers a distinctive explanation: the boundaries
of vague terms according to Williamson are sharp but unstable—“heap,”
“blue,” or “permissible” will pick out distinct properties, with different
sharp cutoffs, in nearby possible situations, depending primarily on
the usage of the term across the whole community. Someone who in-
spected a sorites sequence and formed a judgment about the location
of the cutoff for blue—believing that patch 545 was blue and 546 was not
blue—might in fact believe truly. But that belief, formed on that basis,
is very easily false, since the cutoff for the term would shift with just mi-
nor variations of remote usage. So the Williamson picture is this: our at-
titude to x is red when x is a borderline red/orange should be quotidian
uncertainty, where this is uncertainty with a peculiar, distinctive source
in metasemantic plasticity—the fact that they have an unstable extension
that sensitively depends on the details of usage.
For our purposes, the significance of epistemicism is just to under-
write the central reductive claim that attitudes to indeterminacy are just
special cases of quotidian uncertainty. And the significance of that is to
pass the buck to whatever independent theories of quotidian Uncertain
Oughts we have on the shelf. This is not the place to tackle that general
debate, but I will make two remarks about choice points in this reductive
account of decision oughts under indeterminacy.17. See Williamson, Vagueness.
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AA. Factual versus Normative Uncertainty
The first choice point is whether the uncertainty induced by indetermi-
nacy should be represented as factual uncertainty relevant to the applica-
tion of known moral principles or normative uncertainty about what
those moral principles are. This is vital when the two cases are handled
differently. For example, if I am factually uncertain about the conse-
quences of pressing a button—whether it will give us all nasty headaches
or make good food appear on the table, I may still be certain about the
value of each possible outcome. Plausibly what I ought to do, in the
decision-ought sense, is that which maximizes the subjective expected
value of the terms: the average value across possible outcomes of the act,
weighted by my confidence that the action would bring about the respec-
tive outcome. On the other hand, suppose I know the outcome of a pos-
sible act but am uncertain about the value of that outcome. I may know
what happens to Alpha if she steps into a virtual reality simulation of
her perfect life but be uncertain whether the correct axiology would
say that this is a good outcome (for Alpha or in general) or a poor out-
come, because I do not know how much it normatively matters that Al-
pha’s pleasure is derived from social relations with real-world people
rather than figments of the program. Rival coherent axiologies would
rate the scenario differently, andmy uncertainty is normative uncertainty
if it’s over which one of these is correct.
My own view is that normative uncertainty should be treated very dif-
ferently from factual uncertainty; indeed, I think normative uncertainty
should simply be set aside in determining what an agent decision-ought
to do.18 A simple model for my view would be the view that you decision-
ought to do something if that thingmaximizes the subjective expectation
of objective value. Factual uncertainty is factored into this quantity—it
determines what is expected. But an agent’s uncertainty over objective
value itself is irrelevant to this calculation.
If that is right, determining which category of uncertainty moral in-
determinacy produces is important.19 Schematically, suppose that an ax-18. See Gideon Rosen, “Culpability and Ignorance,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
103 (2003): 61–84, and “Scepticism about Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Perspectives 18
(2004): 295–313; and Elizabeth Harman, “Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate?” Ratio 24
(2011): 443–68, for recent contributions to the debate on whether moral ignorance is ex-
culpatory. I am taking it here that it is not, though all I really need to make the point is that
moral ignorance/uncertainty and factual ignorance/uncertainty receive different treat-
ments. There is a further topic—the focus of discussion of ‘normative uncertainty’—about
what an agent (who desires to be moral) is rationally required to do, given uncertainty
about what morality demands. That raises some interesting questions but is not the ques-
tion that we are dealing with here. For this view, see Andrew Sepielli, “What to Do When
You Don’t Know What to Do,” Noûs 48 (2013): 521–44.
19. The exception is indeterminacy outside the moral code. Where one has promised
that p, and there is a moral rule prohibiting promise breaking and an outcome where (it is
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Aiological rule tells us that any outcome gets value 1 iff that outcome is
such that D holds, and value 0 otherwise, and that w is an outcome in
which it is borderline/indeterminate whether D—which according to
the current analysis means we’re uncertain (under the supposition that
w is actual) whether D holds, that is, whether being in w is being in w*
(like w but where D obtains) or being in w** (like w but where D fails
to obtain). Now, if the vagueness of D is factual uncertainty, and if I di-
vide my credence evenly across w* and w**, conditionally on w obtain-
ing, then an act known to produce w will have expected value 0.5. But
if it is normative uncertainty, then the expected value will be either 11
or 0 (and my normative uncertainty will prevent me knowing which). If
I have to choose between bringing about w and an action with expected
value 0.8, then the former but not the latter model will imply that I’m in
a position to know what I decision-ought to do.
I am inclined to think of indeterminacy in the moral code as issuing
(given epistemicism) in factual not normative uncertainty, but I am not
aware of any compelling arguments either way. Some considerations
both ways are given in a footnote.20
B. Models of Quotidian Uncertainty
The second choice point concerns the character of quotidian uncertainty
produced by indeterminacy. One thought is that when we know that
something is paradigmatically borderline blue, or a borderline case of
a person or of a permissible act, then we should have an intermediateknown that) it will be indeterminate whether p, then it seems to me that the quotidian un-
certainty over p that the epistemicist predicts will be factual rather than normative uncer-
tainty.
20. One might think of the axiological rule in the main text as producing uncertainty
about value. After all, an agent can have full knowledge of a canonical description of an
outcome w and still be ignorant (in a quotidian sense) of whether or not D. The reason
for that is seemingly that there are two possible sharp value functions that the vague spec-
ification may, for all the agent knows, pick out (one which maps w to 1, the other that maps
w to 0). Ignorance of the One True value function is normative uncertainty. That line of
thought suggests that under the epistemicist reduction, axiological indeterminacy is a
source of normative uncertainty, not factual uncertainty. But there are aspects of the case
that sit oddly with this diagnosis. For example, ex hypothesi we know a canonical formula-
tion of the moral principles in question—to be sure, there’s uncertainty about how to ap-
ply it, but our knowledge of the moral rule itself is impeccable. That suggests the epistemi-
cist ignorance is not moral but factual ignorance. We can model this by taking ‘outcomes’
to be doxastic possibilities for the agent. There are two relevant outcomes in the vicinity:
one in which the underlying facts are as specified by w, and D is the case, and another with
the sameunderlying facts, where not-D is the case. The vague axiological rule applied to out-
comes individuated in this way yields a determinate function from outcomes to values—
e.g., we know that the first has value 11 and the latter value 0. But it will be an open ques-
tion for us which of these outcomes an action that yields D will produce. Framed in this
way, our uncertainty is uncertainty about a factual matter.
This content downloaded from 129.011.023.120 on March 31, 2017 07:18:49 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
656 Ethics April 2017
Acredence that it is blue/a person/permissible. Another, for skeptics of
the degrees-of-belief model of uncertainty, may think of uncertainty as
residing in a positive state of suspending judgment.21 And in the recent
literature, a third intermediate model has been proposed. According to
the imprecise belief model an agent’s cognitive attitudes are graded but not
modeled by real-valued measures of confidence (the typical formal model
of this involves confidence intervals or more generally a set of real-valued
credences that the agent is open to).22 Each of these rival models of quo-
tidian uncertainty requires a different treatment of the decision ought
under uncertainty, and there’s more controversy in some of the cases
than in others concerning what this should be.
Some resolutions of this choice point bring new arguments against
the reduction of moral indeterminacy to quotidian uncertainty. For ex-
ample, Chang, in her discussion of aggregating values, identifies a num-
ber of characteristics of decision making in such ‘superhard cases’.23 If
you are torn by the conflicting values realized by giving to the arts charity
or to the homeless, then, for Chang, you are permitted to give to either.
On the Bayesian model of uncertainty over which is better, this dual per-
missibility must be represented as a case in which the expected utilities
of each, for the agent, are tied. But on thatmodel an extra penny donated
to one or the other option (a moral “sweetener”) would break the sym-
metry. But this is not how the quandary generated by aggregation of val-
ues works—even after the sweetener is added, the quandary remains. The
Bayesian model fails to capture this, and this might be an argument that
something other than quotidian uncertainty is going on. So if quotidian
uncertainty is Bayesian, there is reason to reject the epistemicist reduc-
tion of value aggregation indeterminacy, at least, to that of quotidian un-
certainty.24
C. Evaluating Moral Epistemicism
The reduction of Indeterminate Oughts to quotidian Uncertain Oughts
needs to be underwritten by a tenable theory of indeterminacy. We’ve21. See Jane Friedman, “Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief,” inOxford Studies
in Epistemology, ed. Tamar Gender and John Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), 4:57–81.
22. A very helpful survey of formal models of (quotidian) uncertainty can be found in
Joseph Y. Halpern, Reasoning about Uncertainty, rev. ed. (2003; repr., Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2005).
23. See Ruth Chang, “Parity, Interval Value and Choice,” Ethics 115 (2005): 315–50.
24. Schoenfield, “Decision Making in the Face of Parity,” develops an interesting ar-
gument against using imprecise beliefs (at least as standardly modeled with sets of proba-
bility functions) as a model of uncertainty characteristic of value aggregation. Her point, if
correct, would also refute the indeterminacy-based model defended in my “Indeterminacy,
Angst and Conflicting Values” and discussed in Sec. V below.
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Abeen taking the underwriting theory to be epistemicism. But rather than
replay general animadversions against epistemicism, I want to highlight
a single but central worry, local to the moral case.
The basic problem can be expressed straightforwardly. The refer-
ence of basic moral terms like “permissibility” remains constant under var-
iations of usage—they are metasemantically stable. On the other hand, Wil-
liamson’s epistemicism makes the denial of metasemantic stability (what
we earlier calledmetasemantic plasticity) the heart of what vagueness is.25
So this account is inapplicable to the vague term “permissibility.”
That “permissible” is not only stable butmassively stable is the lesson
of Horgan and Timmons’s moral twin earth.26 Recall the setup: Earth and
Twin Earth are similar in many respects. Visitors from one to the other
would assume they were speaking the same language, in the same natural
environment. But there’s a crucial difference: the property that causally
regulates the deployments of “permissible” in Twin Earth is according with
the categorical imperative, whereas the property that plays that role on Earth
is, we’re supposing, some suitably nuanced consequentialist property.
Other than that, “permissibility” plays analogous roles in both communi-
ties—a basis for praise and blame, a guide for action, and so forth. Visi-
tors from Earth to Twin Earth may note the difference in opinion about
what counts as permissible by the lights of the new society. But—the claim
is—they would regard this as a first-order disagreement about what is per-
missible, not as a discovery that the two societies are talking about differ-
ent things when they use the counterpart words. Themoral of moral twin
earth is that even drastic differences in communal dispositions to deploy
“permissible” do not shift its boundaries—it is metasemantically stable.
Macrostability of the referent of “permissibility” is in principle com-
patible with microplasticity. Like a stone loosely stuck in a hollow, a posi-
tion may be unstable on the scale of millimeters but not be shiftable by
meters or miles. However, the Twin Earth case seems to be just as strong
if we imagined the two communities had, for example, systematically dif-
ferent dispositions for applying “permissible” to borderline cases. The
ur-phenomenon here is that a term possessing the kind of role in prac-
tical reasoning of “permissibility” will continue to pick out permissibility
under both macro- and microvariations of usage.2725. Compare the discussion of moral twin earth and moral vagueness in Miriam
Schoenfield, “Moral Vagueness Is Ontic Vagueness,” Ethics 126 (2015): 257–82.
26. See Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons, “Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral
Queerness Revived,” Synthese 92 (1992): 221–60.
27. Another argument in the literature, found in Constantinescu’s “Moral Vagueness”
and prefigured in TomDougherty’s “Vague Value” (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
89 [2013]: 352–72), is the charge that epistemicism about moral matters, with its implica-
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AD. Summary
This part has evaluated whether a theory of vagueness can (i) underwrite
the reduction of attitudes to the indeterminate with ordinary uncertainty
and (ii) allow vague terms to be metasemantically stable. As Schoenfield
notes, many other accounts that cohere with (i) have the same problem
with (ii)—among them Kearns and Magidor’s doctrine of arbitrary ref-
erence and Sorensen’s truth-maker gap epistemicism.28
I do know of one theory that promises both (i) and (ii). This is the
account of metaphysical indeterminacy outlined by Barnes and Williams
as applied by Barnes and Cameron to the case of indeterminate future
contingents (e.g., tomorrow, the trains will be halted by flooding in the
valley).29 It is important to Barnes and Cameron that their account does
not demand that we revise our quotidian attitudes to future contingents;
those attitudes being, in paradigm cases, uncertain. The theory of in-
determinacy that this is built on takes indeterminacy to be a primitive
feature of the world, and there’s nothing comparable to the plasticity
required by the theories of Williamson and others.30 Despite some con-
cerns I have about the Barnes and Cameron development of the view,3128. Schoenfield, “Moral Vagueness Is Ontic Vagueness.” See Stephen Kearns andOfra
Magidor, “Semantic Sovereignty,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2012): 322–
50; and Sorensen, Vagueness and Contradiction.
29. See Elizabeth Barnes and J. Robert G. Williams, “A Theory of Metaphysical Inde-
terminacy,” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, ed. Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 6:103–48; and see Elizabeth Barnes and Ross P. Cam-
eron, “The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism and Ontology,” Philosophical Studies 146
(2009): 291–309, and “Back to the Open Future,” Philosophical Perspectives 25 (2011): 1–26.
30. This suggestion would cohere with the lesson Schoenfield draws from her discus-
sion in “Moral Vagueness Is Ontic Vagueness”: that (for a moral realist) moral vagueness is
ontic vagueness. Constantinescu argues in “Moral Vagueness” against the combination of
nonnaturalist moral realism and ontic vagueness, though I believe the treatment of prim-
itivemetaphysical indeterminacy/ontic vagueness developed inBarnes andWilliams, “Theory
of Metaphysical Indeterminacy,” is not vulnerable to his charges.
31. My concern relates to a challenge directed at supervaluationism in chap. 5 of
Williamson’s Vagueness—whether it can distinguish itself from epistemicism. Field suggests
that we appeal to the distinctive cognitive role of indeterminacy, i.e., the supposed fact that
attitudes to indeterminacy are not quotidian uncertainty, to respond to Williamson’s con-
cerns. See Hartry H. Field, “Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle,” Noûs
tion that there exist unknowable moral truths, is in tension with epistemic constraints on
morality, i.e., Epistemic constraint on reasons.—If R is a normative reason for X to F, then R
can feature in a rational justification of the claim that X ought to F, a justification which X
knows or could come to know if X’s reasoning were maximally improved. Crispin Wright,
“Vagueness: A Fifth Column Approach,” in Liars and Heaps, ed. J. C. Beall (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 84–105, provides an elegant argument against epistemicism about
vagueness in any domain subject to an epistemic constraint. Interestingly, his argument
would generalize to any ‘verdict excluding’ theory of vagueness, including, e.g., the truth
value gapper theory below.
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Ait is a more promising theoretical option for trying for a reductive ap-
proach to the Decision Ought Challenge for indeterminacy than the
more familiar epistemicist strategy.
IV. NONCLASSICISM
Epistemicism and the other theories we have been looking at so far are
logically and semantically conservative. If one of those theories holds,
standard classical logic and classical bivalent semantics apply to vague
language just as much as the precise language of the exact sciences. Non-
classical theories of indeterminacy, on the other hand, think that inde-
terminacy requires some revision of that canon. Here is Parfit, for exam-
ple, floating a nonclassical approach to moral indeterminacy:3
34 (20
278–3
ll use Some questions may be indeterminate, in the sense that they have
no answer. That is sometimes true, for example, of the question “Is
he bald?” If some man has no hair, he is bald. If some man has a full
head of hair, he isnot bald. But we cannot plausibly assume that, in
all cases between those two extremes, any man must either be, or not
be bald. In many cases, though it is not true that some man is bald,
it is also not true that this man isnot bald. Similar claims might ap-
ply to normative questions.32The classical law of excluded middle says that for any proposition p,
p or not p, and Parfit is saying that in borderline cases we cannot assume
this. The classical principle of bivalence is that for any proposition p,
either p is true or p is false. Parfit asserts counterinstances, or truth value
gaps: propositions which are neither true nor false.
If we have a gappy account of normative indeterminacy, as Parfit
does, then I see no plausible way of treating Indeterminate Oughts as
Uncertain Oughts. If a proposition p is untrue, then you shouldn’t have
any confidence in it, and certainly not middling or imprecise confidence
of quotidian uncertainty. The link between revisionary theories of truth
values and positive accounts of the cognitive role of indeterminacy is at
the heart of a family of ‘nonclassical theories of mind’ I’ve been develop-
ing in recent work.
Nonclassical theories of vagueness are many and varied. For present
purposes I concentrate on three broad categories. There are gap theo-
ries such as Parfit’s, on which indeterminate cases are neither true nor
false. There are glut theories, associated with philosophers like Dominic
Hyde and Graham Priest, on which indeterminate cases are both true2. Derek Parfit, On What Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 2:559–60.
00): 1–30 (repr. Truth and the Absence of Fact [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001],
11). But of course this is exactly what Barnes and Cameron must deny.
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Aand false.33 And there are scalers, for whom truth comes in degrees, with
indeterminate cases intermediately true.34
A. The Nonclassical Axiological Approaches: Gluts, Gaps, Scales
One of the most striking features of a nonclassical approach is that it has
the capacity to silo certain kinds of moral indeterminacy, allowing inde-
terminacy in the content of the moral code to persist without generating
Indeterminate Oughts. Anaxiological rule is something that specifies the
value of an outcome. There may be several such rules that apply to a sin-
gle outcome—if so, they will need to be aggregated in some way (this in
turn can lead to structural moral indeterminacy, as we saw earlier). But
for the purposes of a simple model, let us suppose that a single axiolog-
ical rule determines the moral value of an outcome.
We want a sample axiological rule that’s simple to state and indeter-
minacy involving. I will use an artificial example, so one can see themech-
anisms in play without the distraction of worrying about the plausibility
of the moral axiology. Once the mechanisms are appreciated, the trans-
fer to the case of moral axiology will be straightforward.
Consider the bower bird. The bower bird loves blue things. The
bower value of an outcome is equal to the number of blue objects that
exist in that scenario. Bower value can and probably will be indeterminate,
for outcomes very often have borderline cases of blue things in them.
At first it appears that this axiological indeterminacy generates
ought indeterminacy. Suppose that the bower bird has a choice between
pecking to the right to create one additional blue object or pecking to
the left to create two objects that are borderline blue or refraining from33. See Dominic Hyde, “From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts,” Mind 106 (1997):
641–60; and Graham Priest, In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent, 2nd expanded ed.
(Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1986; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
34. See, e.g., Kenton F. Machina, “Truth, Belief and Vagueness,” Journal of Philosophical
Logic 5 (1976): 47–78, repr. Vagueness: A Reader, ed. Rosanna Keefe and Peter Smith (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 174–204; Nicholas J. J. Smith, Vagueness and Degrees of Truth
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Williams, “Nonclassical Minds.”My personal pref-
erence is for supervaluational-style variants of all three approaches (supervaluationism,
subvaluationism, and degree supervaluationism, respectively). Such approaches always en-
dorse excluded middle and never endorse explicit contradictions. There are more radical
gappers, glutters, and scalers—and Parfit, denying excludedmiddle, is among them—how-
ever, the differences make no difference for present purposes, and they are covered by my
taxonomy. Not covered are those who posit non-real-valued (e.g., partially ordered) truth
values—though in Dummett’s terminology, it is assertoric rather than ingredient truth value
that matters here, e.g., the structure of what plays the role of a designated value (see Mi-
chael Dummett, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1991], 47–49). Even intuitionism can be represented within the taxonomy—the status of
being forced in a Kripke model acting as truth value 1 and otherwise 0. Field’s skepticism
over the very existence of semantically relevant truth values is the most interesting and well-
developed exception to my approach that I’m aware of.
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Apecking and sustaining the status quo. Let’s suppose that the status quo
features N determinately blue things, and no borderline cases, for a value
of N. Pecking right then has bower value N 1 1, refraining from peck-
ing has bower value N, and pecking left is indeterminate in bower value.
If the new objects are blue, then it has bower value N1 2 and is optimal.
If the new objects are not blue, then it has bower value N and is subop-
timal. But it is indeterminate whether the new objects are blue and ac-
cordingly indeterminate whether the bower bird should peck to the
right or left.
Everything turns on the bower value that our rule assigns to the out-
come produced by pecking left. Notice that the following two rules spec-
ify the same function, given standard classical assumptions:3
Press,
truth
ll use (Rule 1) BV(w) 5 N iff in w there are exactly N blue things.
(Rule 2) BV(w)5 N iff in w there are exactly N things such that it is
true that they are blue.What is crucial to bear in mind is that these are inequivalent in many
nonclassical settings. This is because their classical equivalence derives
from the principle:(Truth Equivalence) p is true iff p.Anyone who wants to (a) maintain modus tollens, (b) reject contradic-
tions, and (c) assert truth value gapsmust give up this equivalence schema.
Suppose for reductio we have Truth Equivalence. The existence of a
truth value gap tells us that it is not true that p, nor true that not p.
Tollens on the first conjunct to get not-p. Tollens on the second to get
not-not-p. Putting them together results in a contradiction. Formally:1. True(p)↔ p assumption for reductio
2. :True(p) ∧ :true(:p) truth value gap
3. :True(p) from 2
4. :p modus tollens on 1 and 3
5. :True(:p) from 2
6. ::p modus tollens on 1 and 5
7. :p ∧ ::p from 4 and 6Something must go, and the truth value gapper pins the blame on the
equivalence schema.35 In doing so, they make rule 1 and rule 2 inequiv-
alent.5. See Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
1992). Wright, holding fixed Truth Equivalence, uses this line of reasoning against
value gaps.
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AConsider what the gapper says about the axiological rule specifica-
tions above. Applied to the key scenario, rule 1 as before tells us that the
value of pecking left is indeterminate between N and N 1 2. But since
the two new items are indeterminate cases, for the gapper it is not true
that they are blue. So they do not contribute to bower value, according
to rule 2. According to rule 2, the bower value of that scenario is N, just
the same as the status quo. So rule 2 makes pecking right the only option
that increases bower value and so determinately the one to choose. The
lesson, first and foremost, is that single axiological rules undergo fission
when we move to a nonclassical setting—typically into one that produces
indeterminate value assignments and others that do not.
We have seenmy suggestion for one nonclassical theorist—the truth
value gapper. But the point extends to other theorists. For the glutter, the
value assigned by rule 1 is again indeterminate, but rule 2 will assign value
N 1 2 to the outcome produced by pecking left. After all, that outcome
contains two additional borderline blue things, and by the lights of the
glut theory, that is two more things such that it is true that they’re blue.
Again, indeterminacy in what one ought to do is removed, this time re-
placed by the advice to choose to peck left.
What of those who, rather than positing gaps or gluts in truth value,
posit truth that comes in degrees? Such scalers can appeal to a general-
ization of rule 2 above:ll use (Rule 3) BV(w)5N iff in w, N5 the sum of the degree to which x is
blue, for every x.If we think of the classical case as positing just two degrees of truth—1
(fully true) and 0 (fully false)—then in the classical case rule 3 is yet an-
other equivalent reformulation of rule 1 and rule 2. But on the scaler’s
theory, an indeterminate blue thing (blue to degree 0.6, say) will con-
tribute 0.6 to the overall bower value of an outcome. In the case at hand,
two 0.6 blue items would give N1 1.2 as the bower value of pecking left;
two 0.4 blue items would give N 1 0.8 bower value to pecking left. So
which act is recommended to the bowerbird depends on the exact de-
gree of truth involved. Yet again, no indeterminate value is induced.
Individuating rules by semantico-logical equivalence, what we have
is two ways of picking out one and the same rule in a classical setting.
There is no reason to even choose one over the other, until we introduce
considerations of indeterminacy. In the context of a nonclassical treat-
ment of indeterminacy, however, rules 1 and 2 pick out different axiolog-
ical rules. And one of those rules does not assign indeterminate value.
There’s no replacement of one rule by another but a refinement of a
new ambiguity. Dialectically, this means that someone who wishes to ar-
gue that we get indeterminate value (and Indeterminate Oughts) fromThis content downloaded from 129.011.023.120 on March 31, 2017 07:18:49 AM
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Aindeterminacy in this part of the content of the moral code needs to give
positive reasons for the favored disambiguation. The key point here is
not that nonclassical settings enforce the truth-centric, indeterminacy-
evading formulation of axiology (rule 2), but they show how indetermi-
nacy in themoral codemay be siloed and not produce any indeterminacy
in value or in what one ought to do.
The point generalizes to deontological prohibitions and moral in-
determinacy outside the code, with minor variations. In the nonclassical
setting, amoral constraint not to break promises is one thing; amoral con-
straint that it never be true that one breaks promises is another; and a
moral constraint that, on promising that p, you ensure p is true is a third.
But all are reformulations of a single rule in the classical setting. Suitably
chosen truth-centric formulations will allow us again to keep the moral in-
determinacy from infecting the question of what one ought do.
For the theorist seeking to understand moral indeterminacy, these
points are central, as they show in a nonclassical setting that (i) the puz-
zle of Indeterminate Oughts need not arise simply from indeterminacy
in axiology or prohibitions but also that (ii) what values outcomes have,
or what actions are prohibited, can depend critically on which theory
of indeterminacy (gap, glut, or scale) we have as a backdrop. These are
points to take to the bank straight away. The strategy, however, does not
generalize very naturally to all cases of moral indeterminacy—for exam-
ple, aggregation indeterminacies. Even the truth-centric principles may
admit borderline cases, if there is higher-order vagueness in the concepts
involved. And, recall, moral sorites for permissibility seem to show us that
we’ve good reason to think that ultimately Indeterminate Oughts are un-
avoidable. For all these reasons, we need to consider what the nonclass-
icist can say about Indeterminate Ought scenarios themselves.
B. Nonclassical Permission: Gluts, Gaps, Scaled Permission
Consider again the decision whether to turn left (to the arts charity) or
right (to the homeless charity). We will suppose this delivers an Indetermi-
nate Ought scenario—a case in which it is indeterminate whether it is bet-
ter to give to the arts or to the homeless and so indeterminate whether
one (objectively) ought to turn left or instead right.
The propositionsone ought to turn right and one ought to turn left are in-
determinate in this scenario, as indeed are it is permissible to turn right and it
is permissible to turn left. The respective nonclassical theories of indetermi-
nacy have distinctive things to say about their alethic status. Gappers will
say none of these is true. Glutters will say that all of them are. Scalers will
say that each is true to a degree.
What attitude should the rational agent take to the proposition that
they ought to turn left, given all this? The earlier reductive account had it
that this would be ordinary quotidian indeterminacy. The nonclassicalThis content downloaded from 129.011.023.120 on March 31, 2017 07:18:49 AM
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Atheory of mind for which I argue elsewhere deploys truth-centric norma-
tive principles for belief to answer this question in the present setting.36
The net result is that gappers should have no confidence either in an in-
determinate proposition or its negation (after all, they know that neither
is true); glutters should have full confidence in both (they know each is
true); and scalers should have partial confidence, aligned to the known
degree of truth. Simply applying these general principles to the Indeter-
minate Ought scenario, gappers will have no confidence at all that either
option is permissible, glutters will have full confidence that both are, and
scalers will have partial confidence in each claim.
Does this help us make progress with the Decision Ought Challenge
under indeterminacy? I will concentrate on gappers and glutters first.
We find two natural ways of extracting an account of the decision ought
in these settings. My view is that (in light of the purpose of having a de-
cision ought in the first place) the gapper should choose one of these
accounts, and the glutter the other, with the upshot that they converge
on a common account (in extension) of what one decision-ought to do. I
will argue that that common account is problematic, however.
Note that if a glutter turns right, then she will be turning right while
fully believing that what she does is (objectively) permissible—indeed,
obligatory.37 From the agent’s point of view, turning right is fully norma-
tively endorsed. Contrast the gapper: if she turns right, she will be doing
so while utterly rejecting the claim that what she does is permissible. The
gappers’ position seems far less happy than the glutters under this de-
scription. A first proposal, then, is that options are decision permissible
just in case it is true that they are (objectively) permissible. When faced
with situations in which it is indeterminate what is objectively permissi-
ble, the glutter will see multiple acts that are decision permissible, while
the gapper will see nothing that is decision permissible. On this pro-
posal, for the glutter, the situation resembles cases of moral ties; for the
gapper, a moral dilemma.
Hard on the heels of this account of the decision ought is its dual.
Rather than focusing on attitudes to permissibility, we might turn to at-
titudes to impermissibility. The glutter thinks all available acts are forbid-
den, while the gapper rejects each impermissibility claim. The glutter36. See my “Generalized Probabilism: Dutch Books and Accuracy Domination,” Jour-
nal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2012): 811–40, “Gradational Accuracy and Non-classical Se-
mantics,” Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (2012): 513–37, “Nonclassical Minds,” and “Indetermi-
nacy, Angst and Conflicting Values.”
37. It may seem strange that the glutter believes that turning right is obligatory, when
she also believes that an alternative—turning left—is permissible. But the glutter equally
believes that turning right is not obligatory and that turning left is not permissible. The
truth value glutter believes indeterminate cases are those in which both a proposition
and its negation are true and so endorses them both. This is certainly strange, but it is a
feature of the glutter’s approach to indeterminacy in general.
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Awho takes an action now seems to be in the unhappy position—of doing
what is by his or her own lights impermissible. So a second candidate the-
ory of the decision ought would say that options are decision impermis-
sible just in case it is true that they are impermissible. Now the situations
are reversed. Under this account, it is the glutter who sees a moral di-
lemma, in the decision-ought sense, and the gapper who sees the case
as one of a moral tie.
I suggest that the package deals that result in decision-ought dilem-
mas should be rejected. The point of a decision ought was to give im-
plementable advice. Faced with two options, “do either” is implementable
advice; “do neither” is not. Accordingly the gapper has strong reason to fa-
vor the impermissibility-focused account, and the glutter has reason to fa-
vor the permissibility-focused account.What account of the decision ought
is fit depends on the background theory of indeterminacy in play. The up-
shot, as promised, is that both glutters and gappers would see options in
Indeterminate Ought scenarios as decision permissible.
But this sort of story has problems. Suppose we face a decision be-
tween two options in which one is determinately objectively permissible
and the other is an indeterminate case of objective permissibility. Let’s
suppose for the sake of argument that there is a moral obligation to keep
promises one has made. I have promised to bring the bower bird some-
thing blue. In front of me, I have a blue plastic spoon, and a greenish-
bluish plastic fork, and these are the only two things I could bring. If I
bring him the former, it is determinate that I keep my promise. This is
determinately objectively permissible. If I bring him the latter, it is inde-
terminate whether the promise is kept. It is indeterminate whether this is
objectively permissible. In such a case, the thing to do, surely, is to give
the bower bird the spoon. Our favored package deals, that is, glutters
with the permissibility-centric account of the decision ought or gappers
with the impermissibility-centric one, have some explaining to do. It is
very unclear how they can account for this case.38
I leave this as a puzzle for glutter and gapper theorists of moral in-
determinacy to tackle. It is a distinctive puzzle about their account as ap-
plied to indeterminacy in oughts, so even if this is fatal, nonclassical the-
ories may play a role in limiting the number of such cases we have to deal
with, by the evasion tactics of the previous section.38. The other package deals do no better, facing a dual challenge. Change the case so
that we have the borderline blue plastic fork and a determinately red plastic knife and have
undertaken the same promise to the bower bird. Now, surely, the thing to do is to take the
borderline blue fork; bringing the knife should determinately be ruled out. Again, it is not
determinate that taking the fork is objectively better, so capturing this intuition is the job of
the decision ought. However glutters with an impermissibility-centric account of the deci-
sion ought, or gappers with the permissibility-centric one, are committed to a view of the
decision ought on which bringing the fork is decision impermissible.
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ABefore turning to other approaches, we should consider what the
scaler might say about the decision ought. Here there is a more promis-
ing story to be told. In an Indeterminate Ought scenario, the scaler holds
that it is true to various intermediate degrees that each option is permis-
sible (and obligatory). Accordingly, a rational scaler will have more or less
confidence in the permissibility of each action,matching its known degree
of truth. There is a very natural account of decision permissibility for the
scaler—an option is decision permissible iff the degree of truth that it is
objectively permissible is maximal (and equally common alternatives to
maximizing rules, such as satisficing could also be investigated). The max-
imizing rule handles elegantly the troubling cases for gappers and glutters
given above—any determinately objectively permissible option will out-
rank an option that is an indeterminate case. But equally an indeterminate
case of permissibility will outrank a determinately impermissible option.
Scaled decision permissibility delivers the right results in these cases. Of
all the nonclassical theories, scaling emerges from this survey with the best
marks.39
V. INDETERMINATE NORMS
The final approach to Indeterminate Oughts that I will consider builds
on the model of decision making under indeterminacy developed in my
“Decision Making under Uncertainty.” The logico-semantical approach
that lies behind this model I call classical supervaluational.40 Like the
supervaluationist, it posits a range of “sharpenings” of indeterminate
terms—and it is indeterminate whether p exactly when “p” is true on
one sharpening and false on another. It shares this ideology with su-
pervaluational gappers, glutters, and scalers, since a definition of truth
as truth on all sharpenings produces truth value gaps, a definition of
truth as truth on some sharpening delivers truth value gluts, and a def-
inition of truth to degree d as truth on d percent of sharpenings delivers
real-valued degrees of truth. However, the classical supervaluationist re-39. This answer to the Decision Ought Challenge for indeterminacy predicts that (un-
der full factual information) the decision-permissible option is one which we have most
credence is objectively permissible. Famously, the analogous suggestion for quotidian un-
certainty, though quite natural, is wrong—as drug or miner’s cases show. See Smith and
Jackson’s “Absolutist Moral Theories” for a paradigmatic case against it.
40. It is sometimes also called “nonstandard supervaluationism.” See Vann McGee
and Brian McLaughlin, “Distinctions without a Difference,” suppl., Southern Journal of Phi-
losophy 33 (1994): 203–51, for early advocacy. A version of this is used in Barnes and Wil-
liams, “Theory of Metaphysical Indeterminacy.”My “Decision Making under Indeterminacy”
represents my preferred development of the cognitive role of the theory, a rival to the devel-
opmentof the theory inBarnes andCameron, “OpenFuture,”and “Back to theOpenFuture,”
discussed in Sec. III.
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Afuses to endorse any one of these options or their accompanying distinc-
tive accounts of the cognitive role of indeterminacy. Instead, for the clas-
sical supervaluationist, truth—that at which belief aims—is truth on the
one correct sharpening. But which sharpening is correct is indetermi-
nate. So it is indeterminate whether p is true, when p itself is indetermi-
nate.
Recall that classically equivalent specifications of a single indetermi-
nate axiological principle split into specifications of distinct rules when
we adopted one of the nonclassical accounts of indeterminacy, for exam-
ple,4
racy,”
d in p
drawn
“A No
and “
ory, if
degre
ll use (Rule 1) BV(w) 5 N iff in w there are exactly N blue things.
(Rule 2) BV(w)5 N iff in w there are exactly N things such that it is
true that they are blue.This is a quite general phenomenon. For example, the following two
evaluative schemes for belief are classically equivalent but diverge in
the nonclassical setting:(Accuracy 1) A belief that p is accurate iff p.
(Accuracy 2) A belief that p is accurate iff it is true that p.From the first we can derive that it is indeterminate whether believing
that p is accurate in cases in which p itself is indeterminate. From instances
of the second, by contrast, we can derive that a belief that p is inaccu-
rate in the same circumstances, and if the second principle holds deter-
minately, then it would be determinate that a belief that p is inaccurate in
those circumstances, explicitly contradicting the first principle. Truth-
centricnorms on belief such as the second principle are what I use in work
on nonclassical theories of mind to underpin the cognitive attitudes to
the indeterminate earlier associated with gappers, glutters, and scalers.41
Dialectically, endorsing classical supervaluationism strips away this
phenomenon. We are left just with the original principles and can no
longer play with distinctive truth-involving rules. We are left with equiv-1. The formulation used in Williams, “Generalized Probabilism,” “Gradational Accu-
and “Indeterminacy, Angst and Conflicting Values,” is that the accuracy of a credence
is measured by the distance of d from p’s truth value. Here the “accuracy measure” is
from the literature on foundations for (classical) Bayesianism (e.g., James M. Joyce,
n-pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism,” Philosophy of Science 65 [1998]: 575–603),
truth values” are specified for each nonclassical theory in a natural way. For any the-
p is true, then it has truth value 1; if untrue, then it has truth value 0, and if it has a
e of truth, the truth value is that degree.
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Aalents to the basic material mode principles as the only (nonrevisionary)
game in town, for both axiological principles and norms on belief.
A. Indeterminate Beliefs
Before turning back to axiological principles and other moral indetermi-
nacies, consider the impact on belief norms. From (the determinate
truth of) the above accuracy principle, when p is indeterminate, and
hence it is indeterminate whether it is true, then it is indeterminate
whether one is accurate if one believes p or inaccurate if one does so.
In sum: it is indeterminate what an omniscient agent would believe. It
is tempting at this point to think that what this principle is recommend-
ing is that one be such that it is indeterminate whether one believes p.
Working within a supervaluation setting, we can determinately make it
the case that we satisfy the above principle if we believe p on those
sharpenings where p and disbelieve p on those sharpenings where not
p. So classical supervaluational accuracy norms fit naturally with a psy-
chology of “indeterminate beliefs”—something often posited in passing
in the indeterminacy literature. As Susanna Rinard emphasizes, these in-
determinate beliefs are an attractive interpretation of the formal models
of imprecise belief that are increasingly used for quotidian uncertainty.42
In the literature on indeterminacy, the idea that the appropriate at-
titudes to indeterminacy are indeterminate beliefs has been defended by
several authors, such as Cian Dorr and Michael Caie.43 This goes beyond
what we can extract from a truth norm on belief. If we ought to be ac-
curate, that principle tells us that it is indeterminate what we ought to
believe—an Indeterminate Ought scenario for belief. By contrast, the
principle endorsed by Dorr and Caie is one in which we ought to have
indeterminate beliefs, a reversal of the relative scope of indeterminacy
and ought.44
If one did pair classical supervaluationism with the Dorr-Caie rec-
ommendation of indeterminate beliefs, one could try to build an ac-
count of decision making under indeterminacy on extant work on deci-42. Susanna Rinard, “A Decision Theory for Imprecise Credences,” Philosopher’s Im-
print 15 (2014): 1–16.
43. See Cian Dorr, “Vagueness without Ignorance,” Philosophical Perspectives 17 (2003):
83–113; and Michael Caie, “Belief and Indeterminacy,” Philosophical Review 121 (2012): 1–
54.
44. It seems to me that the Dorr-Caie proposal may be inconsistent with the principle
laid down. Take an agent who, determinately, believes that p, and p is indeterminate. It is
indeterminate whether this agent is believing accurately, according to the principles I start
from. But the agent does not have an indeterminate belief concerning p and so would vi-
olate the kind of norm that Dorr, Caie, et al. favor. So even though it isn’t determinately
false that this agent’s belief is accurate, they have to argue that it is nevertheless determi-
nately inappropriate.
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Asion making given indeterminate beliefs. Happily for this approach,
there is an extant literature on imprecise belief as a particular kind of
quotidian uncertainty, and Rinard argues that such mental states (mod-
eled by sets of probability functions) be interpreted as representing in-
determinacy in what beliefs the agent has.45 So this holds out the pros-
pect for a novel kind of reduction to quotidian uncertainty, via the claim
that some quotidian uncertainty was indeterminacy in belief all along. Less
happily for the approach, there’s no consensus in the literature on the
right model of decision making given imprecise beliefs.46 On the upside,
Rinard argues persuasively that the indeterminate belief interpretation
of imprecise beliefs can resolve this dispute in the literature. On the down-
side, her suggestion for a decision theory for indeterminate belief, when
applied to our kind of decision situation, would simply be the verdict that
it is indeterminate how we should act. If Rinard is right about the decision
rule appropriate to indeterminate belief, then this is just another way of
getting us back to an Indeterminate Ought scenario. Her approach will
lead to indeterminacy in rational oughts and moral decision oughts un-
der quotidian uncertainty, so if anything it intensifies the Decision Ought
Challenge for indeterminacy.
The Dorr-Caie normative principle goes beyond what we can ex-
tract from classical supervaluationism from independently motivated
truth norms and does not give us a new line on the Decision Ought Chal-
lenge. Accordingly, I will not be assuming it, and what follows begins
from the assumption that when it is indeterminate whether p, it is inde-
terminate whether we ought to believe p.
B. Mind Making and Decision Oughts
The mind-making account of decision making under indeterminacy of-
fers the following picture.47 When it is indeterminate what you objectively
ought to do, and correspondingly what you ought to believe you ought
to do (and you’re aware of this), you have no option but to make up your
mind one way or another. In our original vote-for-Mary scenario, youmay
make up your mind to vote for Mary or make up your mind not to do so.
The distinctive claim here is that you must “make up your mind” in a
stronger sense than one who, faced with two equally good options, sim-
ply picks one over the other. In “Decision Making under Indeterminacy”
I argue, first, that in the relevant sense we are not choosing how to act in
this one instance—to make up your mind to vote for Mary in this situa-
tion is a resolution to act on any future occasion in accordance with
sharpenings of the indeterminacy on which those kinds of sayings count45. Rinard, “Decision Theory.”
46. See Halpern’s Reasoning under Uncertainty for a survey of formal models in the area.
47. See Williams, “Decision Making under Indeterminacy.”
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Aas a promise; making up your mind in the opposite way is similarly an
open-ended resolution to act in accordance with the sharpenings on
which theydonot so count.48 Second, I take it that adopting anopen-ended
resolution to act in this way is to judge that such sayings count as a prom-
ise (mutatis mutandis for the latter). So in making up your mind how to
act in the relevant sense, you make up your mind in a (more literal and)
doxastic sense too—you make a judgment call. Both the practical and
the doxastic profile of the posited “mind making” in the face of indeter-
minacy go well beyond the arbitrary picking we’re familiar with from cases
in which our options are tied for best.
I have just described what agents will do in an indeterminate sce-
nario if they accord with my theory. But what of the normative question
whether they should so act? The bottom line is just as before: it’s indeter-
minate whether the act you choose is what you objectively ought to have
chosen. And analogously, it’s indeterminate whether the belief so formed
is objectively accurate and so indeterminate whether it ought to have
been formed.
I’ll be defending this picture of groundless but binding judgment
calls or acts of mind making as what we decision-ought to do in Indeter-
minate Ought scenarios. So—at least when there is no accompanying
subjective uncertainty to be factored in—the claim is:4
resolv
way o
have e
value
and C
liefs (
1–11)
ory”)
plans)
taken
4
Makin
ll use A choice to X is decision permissible iff it is not determinately ob-
jectively impermissible to X.49This is very close to the decision ought available to the gapper and glut-
ter earlier—I will make the case that it is better motivated and not vulner-
able to the objections that sunk those approaches.
Decision permissibility onmy account gains its status through being
one in which we are immune to neutral sanction. A neutral agent in this
context is someone who doesn’t take a stance on relevant indeterminate
questions. The agent in an Indeterminate Ought scenario is forced to be8. The open-ended commitment arises on pain of becoming a “value pump.” If one
es an Indeterminate Ought on one way on a first occasion, and then on the opposite
n a second, then the net effect can be to leave one determinately worse off. The cases
ssentially the same structure as the value-pump arguments for a similar “binding” in
aggregationproblems given inChang, “Possibility of Parity,” and “Parity, Interval Value
hoice,” and the same phenomenon is at the heart of Elga’s challenge to imprecise be-
Adam Elga, “Subjective Probabilities Should Be Sharp,” Philosophers Imprint 10 [2010]:
. As Williams (“Decision Making under Indeterminacy”) and Rinard (“Decision The-
both observe, applying standard decision theoretic roles to sequences of choices (or
delivers the result that determinately the value-pump sequences ought not be under-
.
9. Compare the relation of “weak” to “strong” permissibility in Williams, “Decision
g under Indeterminacy,” and “Indeterminacy, Angst and Conflicting Values.”
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Anonneutral by circumstance—our question is whether the nonneutrality
is subject to any significant sanction. So, for example, in our original In-
determinate Ought scenario, consider people who voted for Mary in this
situation. It is indeterminate whether they did as they objectively ought.
But to sanction them in the ways appropriate to someone who did not do
as they objectively should, one would be committed to saying that voting
for Mary was not what they objectively should have done. But that is the
very indeterminate question once again. The third party could impose
sanctions but could not do so while remaining neutral on the indetermi-
nate question. If the only source of criticism of your groundless judg-
ment call is from other equally groundless but opposite judgment calls,
then we are no longer fighting over the permissibility of making ground-
less judgment calls in principle (whether they are decision permissibility)
but just reopening the first-order question of which option one objec-
tively ought to take.
So the first half of the mind-making story is a motivation for the def-
inition of decision permissibility above, in terms of the special status of
immunity from neutral criticism. Notice that this is not a rationale that
the glutters or gappers could give for their analogous definitions. The
glutters believe that taking either option is objectively impermissible.
The gappers reject the claim that taking either option is objectively per-
missible. These attitudes can form the basis of criticism of actions taken
that the agent themselves would agree with. So in the glutter or gapper
approach to decision oughts, the discussion is what the proper basis for
criticism in these strange cases might be, and before we resolve that dis-
cussion the agent can’t claim immunity from criticism.
But acts that are decision permissible while failing to be determi-
nately objectively permissible should leave us queasy. In my “Indetermi-
nacy, Angst and Conflicting Values” I offer a diagnosis of this angst.
Faced with an Indeterminate Ought of the kind we are considering,
agentsmustmake an arbitrary judgment call, for example, about whether
what they did counted as a promise. The process that they go through
to form that judgment and choose an option, then, could equally well
have ended up with them taking the opposed line. So it is determinately
the case that they have judged and acted on the basis of a process which
could easily have led to them doing the opposite. They themselves now
judge that, for example, voting for Mary would be objectively permissible
since they now judge that what they did counted as a promise. So by the
same token, they judge that not voting for Mary was impermissible. And
yet they were just an arbitrary choice away from doing just that. Even
though they are committed to thinking that what they did was okay, they
are committed to thinking that the process that led to it was an unreli-
able means to that end. No wonder that it is uncomfortable, especially
when the stakes are high, to make such judgment calls.This content downloaded from 129.011.023.120 on March 31, 2017 07:18:49 AM
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AUnreliability in forming moral judgments or taking moral actions is
a vice of the agent, though not a demerit in the act (an unreliable coffee
machine can make great coffee on occasion—the unreliability is part of
the process, not the product). Moral agents will avoid making decisions
of this character where they can, but sometimes they have no choice.
This explains the two kinds of cases that posed challenges for the glutter
and gapper theory of the decision ought. The first was a choice between
something that is determinately objectively permissible and something
which is only indeterminately so. The mind-making account of the deci-
sion ought says that both are decision permissible but in addition will say
that a moral agent will take the first, since this is the only reliable way to
be objectively permissible. The second challenge was a choice between
something that is determinately objective impermissible and something
which is only indeterminately so. In such scenarios, the best one can do
is to do the right thing unreliably, and so the moral agent will (with angst)
take the latter option. Mind making, in sum, predicts and explains the
right results in these test cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the apparent ubiquity of Indeterminate Ought scenarios, we need
a response to the relevant Decision Ought Challenge. The current arti-
cle has been a field guide to some of the leading options. I have not of-
fered a definite recommendation, but each part above has resulted in a
leading option to pursue. The best strategy identified here for reduc-
ing Indeterminate Oughts to quotidian Uncertain Oughts is the Barnes
et al. combination of a primitive metaphysical moral indeterminacy with
quotidian uncertainty about indeterminate matters. The leading non-
classical strategy I think is offered by the scalers, who can offer an eval-
uation of the degree of objective permissibility of indeterminate options,
which delivers an extremely natural theory of the decision ought in terms
of maximally objectively permissible actions. In the classical supervalua-
tional setting, I advocate the mind-making approach, and I’ve set out
how it provides a rationale for decision permissibility (in terms of im-
munity to neutral sanction) but also a nuanced account of the angst that
attaches to Indeterminate Ought scenarios and can guide action.
Several issues for future research in the area arise from the field
guide. We left open in Section III the question whether the reduction
of Indeterminate Oughts to Uncertain Oughts produces factual or nor-
mative uncertainty. That is a critical choice point, given the divergent
treatments of the two in the offing. Case studies are needed to evaluate
the predictions of the three leading accounts I have picked. For exam-
ple, I’ve defended the Mind Making account as applied to the structural
indeterminacy of value aggregation trade-offs (in “Indeterminacy, AngstThis content downloaded from 129.011.023.120 on March 31, 2017 07:18:49 AM
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Aand Conflicting Values”)—but if we instead prefer to treat indeterminacy
in the scaling way, then we will need to revisit whether the recommen-
dations it delivers cohere with the phenomenon being modeled. Finally,
uncertainty and indeterminacy can easily both be present in a high-
stakes decision situation. So ultimately, we would need not a decision
ought of each in isolation but a combined theory that offers guidance
that speaks to agents suffering from both limited information and inde-
terminacy.This content downloaded from 129.011.023.120 on March 31, 2017 07:18:49 AM
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